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Abstract 
The cost versus response trade-off is a growing logistics issue due to many markets being 
increasingly characterized by demand uncertainty and shorter product life cycles. This is 
exacerbated further with supply increasingly moving to low cost global sources. However, the 
poor response implications of global supply are often not addressed or even acknowledged when 
undertaking such decisions. Consequently, various practical approaches to minimising, 
postponing or otherwise managing the impact of the demand uncertainty are often only adopted 
retrospectively. Even though such generic solutions are documented through case examples we 
lack effective tools and concepts to support the proactive identification and resolution of such 
trade-offs. This paper reports on case-based theory building research, involving three cases from 
the UK and USA used in developing a conceptual model with associated tools, in support of such 
a process. 
1 Introduction 
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Addressing the strategic as well as the cost implications of functional decisions continues to be 
elusive. In the past the resulting misalignment was commonly associated with the incremental 
nature of such change (Hill, 1998), but this does not fully explain the mismatch that commonly 
results from outsourcing decisions. Research suggests that such decisions often lack a holistic 
perspective (Baines, 2003) resulting in a sub-optimal cost focus. The growth in global sourcing, 
however, is increasingly encroaching on markets characterized by shorter product life cycles and 
increasing demand uncertainty. Global supply from low cost sources is, therefore, increasingly 
prone to aggravating the cost versus response trade-off (Nair and Closs, 2006) - a problem that is 
now widely cited, particularly in the apparel industry (Lowson, 2003). 
Practical strategies to address such supply chain misalignments have been widely reported over 
the years, such as Bennetton, Sports Obermeyer (Fisher et al., 1994), Hewlett Packard (Feitzinger 
and Lee, 1997) and more recently Zara. However, the tendency to think functionally rather than 
holistically persists (Fisher, 
1997; Fisher, 2000; Ferdows, 
2003; Geary, Disney and Towill, 
2006) 
This paper seeks to explain the 
growing significance of the cost 
versus response trade-off as well 
as presenting a conceptual 
approach to managing such 
trade-offs in the context of the Exhibit 1 Conceptual Framework
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supply chain. Three case studies, associated with outsourcing, are subsequently analysed in 
relation to this approach. 
2 Research Programme Design 
This paper is part of a wider research project aimed at exploring strategies and supporting 
concepts used to improve the level of stability within a supply chain. The conceptual framework 
is derived from the initial secondary research (see Exhibit 1) and from this some key questions 
were derived: 
• How does internal and external system variation and uncertainty impact on a supply 
chain? 
• How and why do different strategies limit such variation and uncertainty? 
• How and why does the trade-off concept support the strategy development process? 
• How can a company use investments in inventory and capacity to provide greater stability 
in the internal and external phases of a delivery system? 
 
In choosing case studies that explicitly exhibit the instability associated with the cost versus 
delivery speed trade-off, a number of companies involved in realigning their strategies following 
outsourcing decisions were selected. This resulted in a further question - under what conditions 
does local rather than strategic decision-making tend to predominate? This paper addresses these 
questions in relation to the three case studies associated with outsourcing. 
The case-based research method was adopted, given the explanatory nature of the research 
questions being posed (Yin, 1994). Cases were chosen and administered in accordance with 
replication logic (Eisenhardt, 1989). The unit of analysis was the company and data was collected 
with a research protocol using multiple sources of evidence. The data collection method included 
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plant observation, semi-structured interviews, archival records and documents, with due attention 
being given to triangulation and subsequent analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). 
 
3 Secondary research used in the derivation of the conceptual model 
 
The research has identified three conceptual approaches to managing trade-offs in supply chains, 
with particular reference to the cost versus delivery speed trade-off. This review of previous 
research and practice is structured to reflect the derived model.  
 
3.1 The trade-off concept and continuous improvement 
 
Exhibit 2 Traditional Conformance Quality 
Cost Model
Quality
Cost
Total costs
Cost of quality
assurance
Conformance
quality costs
The emergence of management science in the early 
part of the last century was functionally structured 
and resulted in local optimization centred on cost. 
In this way the level of inspection and the size of 
batches were determined via cost models that 
provided a means of optimizing the conflicting 
requirements (see Exhibit 2 and 3).  
By the 1960s the need for organisations to be aligned to specific market requirements was 
identified (Burns and Stalker, 1961) and Skinner (1969) exposed the strategic need to align the 
operations management sub-functions to satisfy market requirements other than price. This work 
was further developed (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1979; Hill, 1985) with concepts to help 
distinguish the different market characteristics and classic process alignments.  
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In Japan, however, they had already embarked on a different approach. Deming’s Japanese 
lecture series from the 1950s had created an awareness of the strategic importance of not just 
realigning the strategic choices but reducing 
special and common causes of variation in an 
organization and thereby attacking the 
conformance quality-cost trade-off at source 
(1982). Deming’s work was considered to be 
central to Toyota’s success and Ohno (1988) 
applied this thinking to production flow and 
similarly challenged the waste associated with poor process reliability and the process 
inflexibility associated with long set-up times. Hence, it is not surprising that some authors were 
questioning the merits of the ‘either or’ mentality associated with the trade-off concept 
(Schonberger, 1982). Ferdows and De Meyer (1990) used empirical research in support of ‘a new 
theory’ that integrated these findings and argued that the trade-off concept, although still relevant 
to strategic decision-making, needed to acknowledge the opportunity to systematically reduce the 
cause of the trade-offs. Their sand cone model suggested a natural sequence to improvement they 
referred to as cumulative capabilities, which starts with quality, followed by dependability, 
flexibility and finally cost. This extended earlier work by Nakane (1986), which emphasised the 
importance of improving quality and dependability before imposing demands for increased 
flexibility on a delivery system. Ferdows and Meyer’s study led to the conclusion that focusing 
on quality reduces the sources of variation in the system, which improves efficiency and reduces 
cost, whereas, focusing on costs does not result in a corresponding improvement in quality. These 
developments stress the importance of understanding how the order of priority, particularly 
Exhibit 3 Traditional Batch Size Cost Model
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concerning cost, impacts trade-offs and although conformance quality versus cost is still listed as 
a trade-off by some industrialists it is now commonly acknowledged to be a ‘perceived’ rather 
than ‘real’ trade-off (Da Silveira and Slack, 2001). Mapes et al. (1997) conducted survey research 
that also acknowledges the fact that good performance on one measure leads to good performance 
on other measures. Their work stressed the need to eliminate uncertainty and unreliability as well 
as waste, arguing that much surplus inventory, labour and capital equipment is a consequence of 
uncertainty and unreliability. Slack’s (1998) generic trade-off approach similarly identifies the 
role of flexibility in reducing the impact of variation and uncertainty and therefore the trade-off 
implications. 
 
3.1.1 Developing the trade-off concept 
 
Schmenner and Swink (1998) in developing 
this conceptually have proposed a ‘theory of 
performance frontiers’ distinguishing 
between an asset and an operating frontier. 
Exhibit 4 illustrates this concept in relation 
to the operating cost versus supply lead-time trade-off. An asset frontier defines the performance 
trade-off under ideal operating conditions, so defining the performance limits of the physical 
assets. Whereas, an operating frontier acknowledges the limitations of the infrastructure system 
variables (such as quality, process reliability and set-up times) associated with policies. 
Therefore, in line with the above, simultaneously improving the system performance on all fronts 
is possible and under these circumstances the operating frontier shifts closer to the limiting 
Operating
Cost
Supply lead-time
Exhibit 4 Illustrative trade-off curve showing the
asset and operating frontiers. 
Asset frontier
Operating frontier
Direction of improvement
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frontier of the current assets. Vastag (2000) usefully adds to this work by stressing the 
significance of the operating frontier as opposed to the asset frontier in gaining competitive 
advantage. He relates this to the tacit performance improvements associated with Toyota that 
have been so difficult to replicate (Alder et al., 1999).  
Goldratt (1990) similarly argues, in what is now commonly known as the ‘theory of constraints’, 
that the performance of a system is rarely constrained by resources and the corresponding asset 
frontier but by what he refers to as policy constraints. His work stresses the importance of 
challenging the assumptions underpinning such policies that give rise to the trade-off models 
typified in Exhibits 1 and 2. The cost focus of these models does not acknowledge different order 
winning criteria and encourages a sub-optimal rather than strategic perspective, consequently 
giving rise to policies that sustain the associated wasteful variation, as illustrated by the concepts 
such as acceptable quality levels and economic batch quantities. 
Whereas Deming and later Ohno universally targeted wasteful variation associated with non-
conformance, reliability and inflexibility under the umbrella of continuous improvement, Goldratt 
developed the use of the trade-off concept to focus strategic improvement. In this way he found a 
means of systematically exposing and challenging the policies that limited (constrained) the 
throughput of the system, akin to shifting the operating frontier associated with specific products 
and markets. His contention was that improving the systems throughput, unlike cost reduction, 
was an inherently focused activity and very few policies or resources constrained a system at one 
time. 
 
3.1.2 Systematically expressing and resolving trade-offs  
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In an attempt to illustrate how the trade-off concept may be used to focus improvement, the batch 
size model has been presented (Exhibit 5) in such a way that the policies and associated thinking 
underpinning the model may be challenged 
systematically. This is in the form of an 
Evaporating Cloud Diagram (Goldratt, 1990) 
otherwise known as a Conflict Resolution 
Diagram (CRD) (Scheinkopf, 1999). 
Exhibit 5 represents the logic of the traditional 
batch optimization diagram (Exhibit 3), where 
requirements B and C are necessary (but not 
sufficient) to achieve the objective A. Similarly the prerequisites D and D’ are necessary (but not 
sufficient) to achieve the requirements at B and C, respectively. The pre-requisite requirements 
are normally shown as opposites to make the contradiction as explicit as possible, so enabling the 
logic underpinning it to be challenged. In TOC terms, the Cloud is evaporated (i.e. the problem is 
solved) if one of the assumptions embodied in an arrow can in some way be invalidated. By way 
of example, in Japan, the Toyota Production System challenged the assumptions underpinning 
the arrow B-D (Shingo, 1990), which states that large batches are a necessary prerequisite for 
reducing set-up costs. Whereas, in the West the arrow AB was challenged when the associated 
cost accounting assumptions were challenged in the 1980s (Kaplan, 1984). Goldratt (1983) more 
explicitly stressed the fallacy of using the inherent spare capacity in batch processing to increase 
excess inventory rather than shortening lead-times through increasing the number of setups. 
However, this wholesale assault on this cost model does not mean that trade-offs disappear but it 
A
Save
cost-per-part
C
Save carrying
cost per unit
B
Save set-up 
cost per unit
D
Enlarge the
batch size
D’
Reduce the
batch size
Objective 
Requirements Pre-requisites
Exhibit 5 Traditional batch size trade-off model in
the form of a conflict resolution diagram.
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does call for a rewrite of the diagram to define the strategic as opposed to cost trade-offs. This 
will be developed further in the next section. 
   
3.2 Investment choice: managing variation 
 
The above research and practice stresses the importance of reducing the sources of variation and 
uncertainty and highlights how policies embodied in sub-functional cost models have and, in 
many cases, continue to constrain the operating frontiers. This section considers the parallel need 
to manage as well as reduce variation in reconciling trade-offs and specifically looks at the 
strategic role of inventory and capacity in achieving this. 
 
3.2.1 The role of inventory and capacity in managing variation 
 
Skinner (1969) advocated making investment choices that were geared to the market or what Hill 
(1985; 2005) calls order winning and qualifying criteria. In this way investments suited to high 
volume low variety manufacture would typically compete on price with high levels of capacity 
utilization and low levels of WIP inventory. Alternatively, low volume high variety products, 
typically competing on delivery speed, would demand more responsive capacity and/or inventory 
to meet the inherent product variation and demand uncertainty that needs to be managed. 
Supply chains may be protected from the disruptive nature of variation and uncertainty by using 
inventory or capacity to protect flow. However, the perception that an idle resource is a waste has 
resulted in the predominant use of inventory in the design of supply chains.  
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Some authors have usefully structured the use of these factors in helping to manage uncertainty. 
For example, Newman et al. (1993) address the need to deal with uncertainties in manufacturing 
by linking flexibility at the macro and micro level to buffering through capacity, inventory and 
extended lead-times [order backlogs] in the form of a dynamic equilibrium model. They 
emphasise the trade-off choices of investing in capacity or inventory to protect flow. Correa 
(1994) links uncertainty and variation to the concepts of flexibility and its role in relieving 
associated trade-offs. Caputo (1996) explores the role of capacity and inventory buffers being 
used in combination and identifies many forms of capacity and inventory buffers, advocating that 
when effectively planned they do not necessarily result in hiding problems. 
 
Fisher et al. (1997) stress the importance of ‘reactive capacity’ in configuring a supply chain to 
address constraints and illustrate this by challenging the concept of minimum lot size policies.  
The planned use of reactive capacity is evident in Goldratt’s (1984) early work on the role of 
bottleneck resources in the management of delivery systems. Batch-processing environments 
have very few bottlenecks (resources constraints), however, the inherent spare capacity in such 
processes is not effectively utilised to enable 
flow (Conway et al., 1988) as cost models and 
local efficiency measures typically drive the 
operational decisions, as already discussed.  
A
Run production
effectively
C Reduce
production
lead-time
B Don’t turn a
non-bottleneck
into a bottleneck
D
Enlarge the
batch size
D’
Reduce the
batch size
Objective 
Requirements Pre-requisites
Exhibit 6 Batch Size CRD in the ‘Throughput World’ 
Source: Goldratt, 1996
The Drum-Buffer-Rope planning and control 
system (Blackstone and Cox, 2002) is based 
on the selective use of capacity and inventory 
to protect flow in a delivery system and the 
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inventory buffers are then systematically managed to identify and target the sources of disruption. 
By this means protective inventory may be systematically reduced as with ‘enforced problem 
solving’/ kaizen but unlike lean, the system acknowledges the explicit use of capacity on most 
resources to protect the flow from the inherent variation. 
With this improved understanding of the role of capacity and inventory together with the 
existence of bottleneck resources, the batch size conflict (Exhibit 6) does not disappear but 
operates at a higher level, or as Schmenner might put it, the operating frontier is closer to the 
asset frontier. In this way the batch size is no longer fixed but varies depending on the availability 
of capacity, a common feature of Advanced Planning and Scheduling (APS) systems. 
In Exhibit 6, requirement C reflects the drive to lower inventory, which is achieved through 
reducing the batch size. Whereas requirement B reflects the primary need to ensure sufficient 
capacity is available, which drives the need to enlarging the batch size and so reduce the capacity 
absorbed by set-ups. 
 
3.2.2 Interpreting lean and agile supply 
 
The agile-lean supply debate (Mason-
Jones et al., 2000) has helped to 
highlight the growing importance of 
managing capacity to enable flow in a 
volatile market. Exhibit 7 serves to 
illustrate the fact that variation and 
uncertainty associated with the product 
Distinguishing attributes Lean supply Agile supply
Typical product Commodities Fashion goods
Market place demand Stable Unstable
Product variety Low High
Product life cycle Long Short
Manufacturing task Low cost Delivery Speed
Delivery penalties Long term contractual Loss of order
Purchasing policy Product specific Assign capacity
Information enrichment Desirable Important
Exhibit 7
Comparison of lean supply with agile supply: the distinguishing attributes
Based on: Mason-Jones et al., 2000 (modified)
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and particularly demand, distinguishes lean from agile supply. Lean supply is associated with 
level production scheduling and the use of finished inventory to decouple fluctuations in demand. 
However, the uncertain demand and short life cycles of many innovative products cannot be 
effectively decoupled by inventory and, therefore, capacity is more actively utilised to protect 
delivery. Fisher (1997) has combined these two aspects of variation in what he refers to as 
functional and innovative products and the associated choice between designing an efficient or 
responsive supply chain. The efficient supply chain with minimal variation is naturally allied to 
lean, whereas the responsive supply chain is dependent on strategically located inventory and 
capacity to enable flow and is more closely allied to the concept of agile (Stratton and Warburton, 
2003). Fisher provides practical guidelines on the need to avoid or reduce sources of variation 
and uncertainty in the first place, but stresses the need to acknowledge the uncertain nature of 
some product-market combinations and the corresponding need for responsive supply chains. 
This is achieved through the strategic location of responsive capacity and decoupling inventory to 
act as a hedge against variation and uncertainty. 
It is important that the limitations of lean 
supply are understood if the strategic needs 
of volatile markets are to be acknowledged 
through appropriate investment. Variation 
and uncertainty in some delivery systems 
may be radically reduced but will never be 
eliminated and will therefore need to be 
managed through appropriate investment in 
capacity and inventory. The form and location of this investment constitutes the associated trade-
A
Run operations
well
C
Fast Response
(Agile)
B
Minimise waste
(Lean)
D
No protective capacity
(Level schedule)
D’
Protective capacity
Objective 
Requirement Pre-requisite
Exhibit 8 Agile/Lean Logistics Cloud
Source: authors
Assumption:
the resulting fluctuations cannot be protected by inventory
Assumption: there is no
advanced information
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off investment choices identified by Skinner (1969). Exhibit 8 may be used to illustrate this trade-
off issue more explicitly. As before, the purpose behind this diagram is to focus attention on the 
strategic conflict, then challenge the underlying assumptions in relation to the specific products 
and markets at issue. The concept of protective capacity has been used to define the explicit 
nature of the conflict linking the dual requirements for fast response and low operating cost.  
The assumptions identified in Exhibit 8 illustrate two commonly cited false assumptions. The 
logic underpinning arrow C-A assumes there is no more advanced information available that 
could be used to reduce the level of uncertainty; a fact readily challenged in the literature 
(Mason-Jones & Towill, 1997) (Fisher, 2000). The assumption underpinning D’-C raises the 
possibility of holding inventory rather than capacity at a more stable position upstream, as in the 
use of decoupling inventory (Mason-Jones et al., 2000). 
It is increasingly important that the role of capacity is considered in enabling flow as increasing 
demand uncertainty puts the holding of inventory increasingly at risk. Once the role of protective 
capacity is acknowledged means of economically focusing its provision can often be readily 
identified as illustrated in the cases that follow. 
 
3.3 Focused choices: separating out the conflict  
Having acknowledged the importance of reducing variation and uncertainty and the role of 
inventory and capacity in managing variation we return to the strategic concept of focus or what 
is referred to here as separating out the conflict. 
The concept of focused manufacturing (Skinner, 1974) is a natural development from Skinner’s 
seminal work (1969), which advocates splitting the manufacturing sub-functions up to form 
‘plants within plants’, where the investment choices are aligned to meet specific market 
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requirements. Fisher (1997) has extended this concept to supply chains, in identifying the match 
between efficient supply chains and functional products, and responsive supply chains and 
innovative products. Others have sought to subdivide the supply chain to separate out and 
minimize the impact of instability attributed to product variety and demand uncertainty, as in the 
concept of postponement (Van Hoek, 1998). Whereas Skinner’s concept of focused 
manufacturing would typically separate out high volume from high variety products the 
associated supply chain equivalent encourages the upstream manufacture of the product to be 
standardized, thus postponing the introduction of product variety with the associated demand 
uncertainty. This strategy is also evident in what is now commonly called mass customization 
(Feitzinger and Lee, 1997). The concept of ‘leagile’ (Mason-Jones et al., 2000) is similarly 
related, but stresses the lean and the agile strategies reflected in the design of the product and its 
manufacture. In this way inventory is used to decouple the agile back end from the lean front end 
of the supply chain. In a similar way, supply of the stable base demand for a product may be 
separated out from potential demand surge by splitting early and late production (Gattorna and 
Walters, 1996). 
 
3.3.1 Developing Skinner’s focused manufacturing analogy 
 
Skinner’s concept of focus clearly has broader application, but the extension of the concept to 
supply chains has limited generalization to date and is often prescriptive in nature rather than 
encompassing design principles that could enable the concept to be more readily considered and 
creatively applied. It is interesting to note that Skinner’s (1969) original argument for the 
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relevance of the trade-off concept to the design of manufacturing systems was related to a 
mechanical engineering analogy.  
‘For instance, no one today can design a 500 passenger plane that can land on a carrier 
and also break the sound barrier. Much the same is true of manufacturing. The variables 
of cost, time, technological constraints, and customer satisfaction place limits on what 
management can do, force compromises, and demand an explicit recognition of a 
multitude of trade-offs and choices.’ 
However, this analogy can now be taken further as the mechanical engineering field has 
demonstrated how such trade-offs provide a focal point for applying innovative principles that 
support the resolution of such trade-offs.  
The theory of inventive problem solving – TRIZ for short (A Russian acronym) – has therefore 
shed new light on this analogy. Genrich Altshuller developed TRIZ over several decades 
(Salamatov, 1999) but although widely applied in Russia it only appeared in the West recently. 
The theory resulted from the empirical analysis of over one million patents and the research 
determined that innovation was closely associated with the resolution of trade-off performance 
conflicts. Subsequent analysis identified that the same principles repeatedly appeared and were 
empirically related to certain types of contradiction or trade-off. The theory comprises several 
tools and principles, designed to support this process and is now commonly associated with 
systematic innovation. One of these approaches readily relates to operations design and is termed 
physical contradictions and separation principles. This solution system requires the trade-off 
contradiction to be defined explicitly, in a similar way to D-D’ in cloud diagrams. In TRIZ this is 
termed a physical contradiction such as: fast versus slow; solid versus porous; moveable versus 
stationary and hot versus cold. This is, therefore, in the same form as used in the clouds cited 
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earlier: i.e. large versus small batch and hold protective capacity versus don’t hold protective 
capacity. Altshuller found that by defining the contradiction around one parameter with mutually 
exclusive states, the principles used to detect a solution could be more generic than other solution 
systems and consists of just four separation principles:   
Separation of opposite requirements in space; 
Separation of opposite requirements in time; 
Separation within a whole and its parts; 
Separation upon condition. 
 
In engineering, where the conflict can be presented in this explicit form, these separation 
principles have proved to be very effective at stimulating the process of innovation with ideas 
that at least partially resolving the conflict. Similarly, these separation principles can be readily 
related to the concept of manufacturing focus and the more recent supply chain strategies 
identified above (Stratton and Warburton, 2003). It is therefore proposed that this concept of 
strategic separation provides a useful means of operationalising the creative application of the 
focusing concept in operations. 
 
4 Conceptual model 
 
This review identifies three conceptual approaches to supply chain improvement and 
demonstrates the link to previous work and the trade-off concept. These three approaches are 
reflected in the following conceptual model (Exhibit 9), which is subsequently used as a 
framework in the case analysis. 
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Exhibit 9 Proposed conceptual model for strategic 
supply chain improvement
Identify strategically limiting operations trade-offs
Explicitly define the strategic conflict
Reduce the underlying variation
and uncertainty
Challenge the assumptions underlying the 
conflict
Manage the residual variation 
and uncertainty
Strategically locate inventory and capacity
to manage the conflict
Restrict variation and
uncertainty
Separate out the conflict
 
 
5 Case-based research evidence 
 
5.1 Case A 
 
Case A, Griffin Manufacturing (Stratton and Warburton, 2003), is a US apparel manufacturer that 
moved into fashion athletic wear in recent years to avoid offshore competition. It provides 
technical support to customer design teams, imports fabric, cuts to size and manufactures 
garments. A few years ago their main corporate customer decided to move the manufacture of 
fashion products to its factory in Honduras which, until then, manufactured ‘basic’ non-fashion 
lines. 
The low cost Honduran supply option, however, required long lead-times. Consequently, orders 
needed to be placed several months in advance and inventory was used to decouple supply from 
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demand. For standard products, such as T-shirts, the long product life cycle meant the risk of 
obsolescence was low, but for the fashion items, the markdown and lost sales costs were 
significant and growing.  
It was not long before the consequences of the outsourcing decision were felt. Although 
Honduras was much cheaper and in most cases could cope with the more technically demanding 
products, the supply lead-times required the buyers to forecast demand well in advance of the 16-
week sales season. Consequently, forecast errors commonly exceeded 25 per cent.  
What eventually resulted was a partnership involving the both in-house and Griffin as suppliers. 
Early orders were placed on Honduras to a cautious forecast and at the start of the sales season 
demand was closely tracked so that the Griffin could fill any predicted shortages in the product 
range within the sales season.  
Here the conflicting requirements of low cost and fast response were separated out in time and 
space with a mixed approach using inventory and capacity investment. The early season orders 
were satisfied by investing in inventory and the later season demand was satisfied by investing in 
responsive capacity that was used to match the demand of what proved to be the more popular 
lines. To maximise the product sales knowledge electronic point of sales data was used to 
improve the forecast accuracy once the sale season had commenced. To ensure the availability of 
Griffin’s capacity the retailer guarantees a minimum of 15,000 to 20,000 garments per week.  
Consequently, if there was no top-up demand to be satisfied Griffin utilised its capacity by 
producing non-fashion goods for stock, that otherwise would have been produced in Honduras. 
The decision to formalize the dual sourcing arrangement was the result of several failed attempts 
to depend solely on Honduras. Over the years Griffin management were repeatedly reminded that 
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the direct cost differential was $1 per garment and when there were management changes at their 
customer this prominent figure dwarfed more strategic considerations. 
 
5.2 Case B 
Case B, Stevensons (Stratton, Warburton and Makins, 2003) occupies a 17-acre site and is one of 
the largest dedicated garment dyeing facilities in Europe, combining expertise with the 
economies of a semi-automated plant. Garment dyeing, as the name suggests, involves dyeing 
garments following their manufacture in ecru (the natural colour of the yarn). The alternative is to 
use pre-dyed yarn in the manufacturing process. Over recent years the company has been part of 
the vertically integrated operations of Coats Viyella, developing colour pallets and garment-
dyeing expertise in support of the exacting demands and responsive needs of major UK retailers. 
Manufacturing a garment in ecru effectively postpones the decision to commit to certain colours 
and with it the ordering of pre-dyed yarn, one of the first steps in the traditional manufacturing 
process. Production runs can therefore be longer and are easier to control, as there is no yarn 
change or adjustment to accommodate the dye related yarn properties. However, most 
importantly, although the ecru garments are produced in bulk the colour processing can be split, 
postponing the colouring of some of the batch so it can be dyed in-line with market demand later 
in the season. In this way the risk of having to markdown stock at the end of a season is reduced 
and since excess inventory losses are typically shared, both the manufacturer and the retailer have 
an interest in matching inventory to actual demand.  
In 2001 Coats Viyella refocused its business interests around the thread business, which resulted 
in them selling off or closing their UK garment manufacturing capacity. At this point many of the 
retailers moved much of their remaining UK production overseas to low cost global suppliers and 
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with it the demand for garment dyeing capacity. A management buyout in 2001 resulted in 
Stevensons becoming part of the Quantum Group.   
By 2002 the sales revenue of the business was a third of what it was in the late 1990s and with 
employees down from 500 to just 100. Stevensons was still used by major retailers to develop 
colour pallets for their product range and where more specialists processing was required, as in 
the case of pigment/wash down looks or the correcting of faulty overseas dyeing, but this was not 
substantial and transient in nature. The survival of Stevensons was in question and they needed to 
rapidly reconsider how their capability could be reconfigured to support this global supply chain.  
With the support of the UK Industry Forum, Stevensons investigated the problems experienced 
further down the supply chain with markdowns and shortages in the retail outlets. In 2002 they 
independently surveyed ten major retail stores looking at the stock levels of various colours and 
sizes of garments previously dyed by Stevensons but that were now yarn dyed and manufactured 
overseas. The survey showed that whereas the availability of sizes was roughly in-line with 
predictions, there were major shortages in some colours and surpluses in others. Subsequent 
discussion with the retailer confirmed that the use of global suppliers was resulting in longer lead 
times, so obliging the retailer to commit to colour well in advance of the season and therefore 
limiting the retailer’s ability to respond to the mismatch between forecast and demand. 
The typical offshore supply lead-time is shown in Exhibit 10. 
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Phase Time (Weeks)1  
Garment shipping 6 
Manufacture 6 
Yarn shipping 4 
Yarn and colour work 4-6 
Exhibit 10 Typical global supply lead-time by phase  
 
However, 30% of orders typically incur a 25% forecast error and it is common for the accuracy of 
forecasting to only significantly improve once demand is analysed at the start of the 12-16 week 
sales season.  
In the case of Stevensons, postponing the dyeing process was the obvious means of avoiding 
uncertainty. Stevensons already had the dyeing facility but now realised they needed to invest in 
the additional, but not difficult finishing process that includes dyeing, label, press, examine, 
package and despatch. Thereby producing garments in ecru form offshore and storing them at 
Stevensons garments could be dyed in line with user demand and delivered to the retailer within 5 
days, a target currently being achieved.  
Building the ecru option into the garment design to enable postponement avoids the current 
demand/supply mismatches and effectively avoids the trade-offs by assigning responsive capacity 
only to the dye and finishing process. Whereas the move to offshore supply two years earlier 
induced a demand/supply mismatch, the offshore ecru supply and local finishing restores the 
balance and ensures both low cost and fast response. In this way product design strategies need to 
                                                 
1 Air transport may be used to compress these lead-times but at significant additional cost 
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not only take account of the technical needs of production but also the business needs of the 
market and the delivery system.   
 
5.3 Case C 
 
Case C concerns a European operation involved in the design and manufacture of industrial 
pumps. The site concerned produces several ranges of pumps within separate business units and 
was until recently serviced by an in-house foundry. The foundry produced cast casings and 
housings that were subsequently machined and assembled with the shaft, impeller and bearings, 
before being mounted on a base plate together with a motor, where required. One of the larger 
business units is focused around a pump range of about 40 sizes and each size might be cast in a 
wide range of materials.  
Recent work on increasing delivery speed had resulted in typical customer lead-times of 4 weeks 
for bare shaft pumps and 6 weeks for motor and base plate assemblies. This time included 
casting, machining and assembly. The in-house foundry lead-time was reliably 4 weeks with the 
capability of a 48-hour response if necessary. The foundry was capable of supplying the full 
range of cast materials with the exception of titanium. Some casing stock was held for the higher 
volume mould material combinations or in utilising a minimum melt quantity. 
Even with a multimillion-pound investment in the foundry, the cost of Chinese and Indian supply 
was 30-50% cheaper than the in-house fully absorbed cost. When the company was taken over, 
the decision was made the decision to close the foundry. For the next 8 months all foundry work 
was to be outsourced onshore, before moving the volume castings offshore to India and China. 
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With the closure of the foundry the lead-time response from the various low-cost onshore 
suppliers typically rose from 4 to 8 weeks with reduced delivery reliability. Furthermore, the 
sourcing of the higher volume more standard ductile iron castings to the low cost factory in India 
resulted in the lead-times rising from 4 to 16 weeks including 4 weeks freight. It is also intended 
to move some of the sizes in stainless steal to India, but the low volume designs and material 
combinations will remain with onshore suppliers for the foreseeable future and produced on a 
make to order basis. These lower volumes represent only 25% of the pumps sales but the 
proportion of overall pump value and margin is significantly higher, amounting to almost 50% of 
the total contribution of the business unit.  
In the case of the onshore suppliers, their order backlog (of which Case C’s castings form a part) 
acts to decouple the manufacturing core from the fluctuating market demand. This backlog 
contributes about 6 weeks to the 8-week lead-time, and furthermore this backlog is not static and 
without preferential treatment contributes to poor delivery reliability. An alternative to being part 
of this order backlog is to provide the casting supplier with order stability by assigning a 
proportion of the supplier’s casting capacity, therefore providing a partial level schedule. By this 
means it has been demonstrated the lead-times can be reduced to a more reliable 2-4 weeks. This 
option is strategically favourable as it supports order winning and qualifying criteria, but does 
come with a cost implication. The demand variation on these higher value castings will result in 
the need to periodically assign work otherwise destined for the low cost offshore supplier.  
 
6 Cross-case analysis 
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In each case study the transition to offshore supply resulted in customer service being 
compromised. In Case A the need for duel sourcing was only accepted in the light of 
experiencing a serious failure to deliver with potential loss of orders. In Case B the decision to go 
offshore brought with it a number of sub-optimal decisions that abandoned a strategic capability 
widely used in the industry. Unlike Coats Viyella, the offshore suppliers did not have a strategic 
interest in matching demand uncertainty and supplying ecru products was not in their interest. In 
addition the retailers’ buyers were typically measured on gross margin, which takes no account of 
the implications of excess inventory or shortages. Hence, the different parts of the new supply 
chain are encouraged to operate independently on cost grounds. One of these major retailers, 
however, has recently specified that offshore suppliers should offer a garment dyeing option and 
buyers are to be measured on net rather than gross margin. However, although the markdown 
prices can be used in calculating the net margin the lost sales resulting from stock-outs is more 
difficult to compute. 
In Case C the purchasing function was directed to source castings based on price, but due to the 
focused manufacturing structure the conflict with delivery speed and reliability was widely 
acknowledged. The Purchasing Manager, for example, had one set of mould tools and needed to 
switch them between foundries to minimise costs. Ductile iron casings were cheaper from one 
foundry but to gain the small melt runs required for the special materials the mould tools also 
needed to be simultaneously at another foundry. Delivery commonly being the casualty and 
evidence suggested that senior management did not see these operational conflicts created by the 
outsourcing decision as their concern.    
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It is apparent that appreciating the strategic issues in decision-making is never as transparent as 
cost. Therefore, when a system is redesigned, as in the case of outsourcing, the individual 
elements will naturally default to their local cost measures unless otherwise directed. 
One way of addressing this issue would appear to be to make the trade-off implications of 
outsourcing decisions more 
explicit. Therefore, there is a need 
to present the implications in such 
a way as to enable appropriate 
strategies to be identified. 
The modified conflict resolution 
diagram (CRD) provides a simple 
means of displaying the conflict 
explicitly and is used here to 
demonstrate an enquiry process that operationalises the three conceptual approaches identified 
earlier. 
A
Maximise
Business performance
B
Minimise unit 
production cost 
(via remote low
cost suppliers)
D
Order early
to long-term forecast
C
Satisfy Volatile
Sales Demand
D’
Order late
to short-term forecast
Objective
Requirements Prerequisites
Assumption:
-There is no possible
advanced information?
Exhibit 11 Generic offshore supply conflict 
Apply
separation
principles
Assumption:- Pipeline delay cannot be reduced?
- Supplier demand needs to be level scheduled?
Assumption:- The resulting fluctuations
cannot be effectively protected by inventory?
The common elements of the CRD, applicable to all three cases, is displayed in Exhibit 11. The 
conflict is explicitly defined in terms of the extended lead-time and therefore the need to order 
early to obtain cost benefits and late to meet market needs. The assumptions identified against the 
arrows illustrate the need to challenge established thinking in terms of the source of variation and 
how it may be managed. The TRIZ separation principles provide a means of exploring how 
variation and demand uncertainty may be restricted and thereby separated out. Finally, the role of 
inventory and capacity in managing the uncertainty and variation is implicitly reflected in the 
assumptions, as in DB and D’C. 
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Exhibit 12 identifies how these three conceptual approaches to resolving or managing the trade-
off relate to strategy developments associated with the three cases. 
Case study Means of reducing 
variation and uncertainty 
Separation strategies 
(Separation Principles) 
Strategic use of capacity 
and inventory  investment 
Case A 
Athletic wear 
Latest sales data used early 
in season  to improve 
forecast accuracy prior to 
placing late order on 
responsive supplier. 
Separate conflicting 
requirements in time (early and 
late ordering) and space (produce 
in Honduras for low cost and 
Griffin for fast response) 
85% of garments produced 
by low cost Honduran supply 
to advanced forecast and 
held as FGI. 
Griffin’s supply (15%) is 
kept responsive through 
reserving capacity and 
holding fabric inventory. 
Case B 
Garment dyeing 
Offshore manufacture 
simplified and supply lead 
times shortened by using 
ecru (none dyed) material as 
standard. 
Separate conflicting 
requirements in time (early and 
late processing), upon condition 
(colour), whole from the part 
(dyeing process at end rather 
than beginning), and space (ecru 
garment supplied offshore, 
finishing onshore) 
Low cost offshore supply 
of garments in ecru 
produced in bulk ahead of 
demand. Invest in a 
responsive dyeing and 
finishing process to enable 
a five day delivery lead 
time. 
Case C 
Pump 
manufacture 
Accelerate the casting 
specification in the design 
process. 
Separate offshore versus onshore 
on condition (standard from 
special) 
Separate in time the release of the 
casting specification. 
Standard castings held as 
inventory from offshore 
supply. Responsive 
capacity reserved through 
local supplier who has 
assigned capacity to replicate 
responsiveness of in-house 
foundry. 
 
Exhibit 12 Cross Case Summary 
 
7 Conclusions 
 
This research has sought to better understand how strategic decision-making can be conceptually 
supported, with the paper specifically focusing on the strategic realignment of supply chains 
when being constructed around low cost global sources. Such decisions clearly exhibit trade-off 
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implications that need to be acknowledged and addressed at the supply chain level. The 
managerial decision to use offshore supply in these three cases highlights how even proactive 
management decisions can overlook trade-off consequences and means of mitigation. 
The research has addressed all the key research questions identified earlier, at least in part, and 
conceptually linked secondary sources with the cross-case analysis. The cases were chosen 
specifically to exemplify the impact of combining demand variation and uncertainty with 
extended supply lead-times associated with low cost global sourcing. The research has 
highlighted how and why strategies may be practically classified as means of reducing, restricting 
or managing variation and uncertainty, with the management being through the strategic use of 
capacity and inventory. The trade-off concept very effectively highlights the need to establish the 
potential negative strategic implications of global supply and the paper has demonstrated how the 
TOC and TRIZ approaches of explicitly defining the trade-off may be used in developing tailored 
strategies. 
The additional question raised during the research concerned the role of local cost measures. In 
all three cases cost was a prime local measurement, which tended to drive local decision making 
often at the expense of responsiveness. This is exemplified in Case B by the gross margin 
measurement on the Buyers, and in Case C the need to move mould tooling between casing 
suppliers to minimise both supplier and tooling costs. In Case A it was evident that the less 
visible strategic benefits of onshore supply were constantly being weighed against the more 
visible cost measures, a particularly common issue raised with changes in management. This 
highlights the importance of the strategic implications of such global sourcing being exposed at a 
high enough level to enable operational strategies and measures to be aligned in support of 
delivery responsiveness. This research is currently being extended to address a wider range of 
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industries including grocery and automotive. Further research is being planned to determine and 
develop the practical managerial utility of the proposed approach. 
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